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I. ADMINISTRATION, ANCIENT & MODERN 
The first thing to acknowledge about administration is that administration 
is coincident with governance. Far from being a modern invention or some 
kind of radical departure from an original political or legal tradition, 
administration is among the oldest practices of governments. Indeed, it is 
impossible to conceive of government without administration. Laws need to 
be enforced, legislation needs to be implemented, and collective goods need 
to be secured. Governance is mostly a matter of actions and practices, making 
administration perhaps the most truly reflective aspect of legal and political 
culture. 
Bernard Bailyn found the “origins of American politics” in the formidable 
and positive administrative tasks of the first colonial legislatures, from land 
distribution to the building of wharves, roads, ferries, public vessels, and civic 
buildings to the establishment of towns, schools, colleges, and religious 
institutions.1 About 60 percent of the laws passed in colonial Virginia, Bailyn 
 
1 BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 103 (1968). As Bailyn put it, 
“colonial legislatures were led willy-nilly, by the force of circumstance . . . to construe as public law 
what in England was ‘private, local and facultative.’” Id. at 102. In South Carolina, examples included 
the administration of “lawyers’ fees,” city “building codes,” the “conduct of seamen,” the “regulation 
of merchandising, the tenure of church pews, and a program of farm subsidies.” Id. at 103 n.37. 
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noted, were essentially administrative, “pertaining to social and economic 
problems.”2 Hendrik Hartog followed this trail of administration from 
colonial legislatures into county courts in eighteenth-century Massachusetts, 
identifying a “continuum of criminal and administrative action” wherein a 
court’s responsibilities “were defined less by its formal legal jurisdiction than 
by the needs of governance”—especially the administration of liquor 
licensing, poor relief, and road building and repair.3 By the early nineteenth 
century, Alexis de Tocqueville deemed this pervasive, popular, and local 
approach to positive administration akin to the essence of democracy in 
America. Tocqueville drew explicit attention to the array of local 
administrators, such as “selectmen,” “assessors,” “collectors,” “road-surveyors,” 
and “tithing-men,” carrying out the administrative policies of “well-
regulated” communities, from the “construction of sewers” and the location 
of “slaughterhouses” to “public health” administration and “licensing.”4 
Formal administrative boards, commissions, departments, and offices were 
part and parcel of early American governmental tradition. 
Moreover, this early original penchant for administration was hardly 
confined to local, regional, or municipal governance. In England, as John 
Brewer and Steve Pincus have most effectively argued, the rationalization and 
centralization of nation-state administration—especially around fiscal and 
military prerogatives—was an important harbinger of modernity (and 
revolution) since at least the seventeenth century. For Brewer, “[t]he late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw an astonishing transformation in 
British government, one which put muscle on the bones of the British body 
politic, increasing its endurance, strength and reach.”5 At the heart of this 
governmental revolution were the clerks—those “pale and shadowy figures” 
at “the seat of dullness”—who implemented “the growth of a sizable public 
administration devoted to organizing the fiscal and military activities of the 
state.”6 Pincus summed up the broad administrative trend that upended 
Europe from the Glorious Revolution to the French Revolution as “state 
modernization”: 
 
2 Id. at 103 n. 37. 
3 Hendrik Hartog, The Public Law of a County Court; Judicial Government in Eighteenth Century 
Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 282, 284, 288, 323 (1976). 
4 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 45, 53 (1838). See also generally 
STEPHEN SAWYER, DEMOS ASSEMBLED: DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF 
THE MODERN STATE, 1840—1880 (2018) (giving a breakthrough revisionist account of Tocqueville 
on administration and police power). 
5 JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688–
1783, at xvii (1989). 
6 Id. at xvi, xvii (emphasis added). 
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[A]n effort to centralize and bureaucratize political authority, an initiative to 
transform the military using the most up-to-date techniques, a program to 
accelerate economic growth and shape the contours of society using the tools 
of the state, and the deployment of techniques allowing the state to gather 
information . . . .7 
Contravening theories of American exceptionalism, this early 
modernization of national administration did not bypass the early United 
States. Rather, Jerry Mashaw has now definitively established the long and 
deep historical origins of American administrative law and a national 
administrative state. “From the earliest day of the republic,” Mashaw 
demonstrated, “Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed 
them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of administrative 
adjudication, and specifically authorized administrative rulemaking.”8 Of the 
fifty-one major federal administrative agencies at the time of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), eleven traced their origins to statutes 
passed before the Civil War, and most of those to the extraordinary creation 
of federal administration in the very first Congress: the U.S. Customs 
Service, Veterans Pensions, Patent Office, Office of Indian Affairs, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, General Land Office, Bureau of Marine 
Inspection and Navigation, Passport Division, Office of the Chief Engineers, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Postmaster General.9 Mashaw 
described the vital activities (and internal administrative rules and practices) 
of a wide range of administrative officers—from the Attorney General and 
U.S. Attorneys to Treasury and Customs and Postal officials—culminating as 
early as 1852 in a national steamboat inspection regime that administratively 
“combined something of the ‘New Deal’ independent regulatory commission 
with ‘Great Society’ health and safety regulation . . . .”10 Nicholas Parrillo has 
supplemented this rich portrait with an even wider accounting of the army of 
administrative officials enabled by the comprehensive fee, prize, and bounty 
systems that proliferated before the modern “salary revolution” in American 
government: district attorney fees for successful prosecutions, tax “ferret” 
 
7 STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 36 (2009). See generally CHARLES 
TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES: AD 990-1990 (1990) (explaining the 
central role of administration in the complex history of European state formation). 
8 JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 5 (2012). 
9 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 8-9 (1941). For 
the classic histories of administration in the United States before the Civil War, see generally 
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948); 
LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1801-1829 
(1951); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1829-
1861 (1954). 
10 Mashaw, supra note 8, at 187. 
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fees for detecting tax evaders, naval bounties for captured ships, land officer 
fees for homestead applications, government doctor fees for deciding 
veteran’s benefits, and so on.11 National administration and a surprisingly 
sophisticated structure of administrative law was entrenched in the United 
States for a century before the so-called invention of modern administration 
in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.  
So we now have a new and “long” history of administration to 
contemplate from 1787 to 1887 and beyond. Clearly administration per se is 
not a recent American invention. The question remains, however, what 
exactly the relationship is between the sprawling early American regime of 
administration acknowledged by Bailyn, Hartog, Tocqueville, Mashaw, and 
Parrillo and the later changes in administrative regulation that took place at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Are these regimes of a piece—similar, 
contiguous, and continuous—reflective of an evolution rather than a 
revolution? Or are there still some dramatic differences and changes circa 1887 
that suggest not a move from absence to presence (historians have certainly 
slain that beast), but perhaps a transformation nonetheless? 
Despite deep historical roots in the American governmental tradition, the 
increased proliferation, professionalization, centralization, and rationalization 
of administration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
amounted to a change in kind—a transformation nonetheless. While 
commentators such as Tocqueville long recognized the origins of 
administration in the practical politics of addressing social problems and 
meeting collective needs (from poor relief to local infrastructural 
development), the very nature and conception of those problems and those 
needs were fundamentally transformed in the era of mass society and mass 
democracy. The basic direction of change moved distinctly from a political 
culture of particularity with a wide tolerance of distinction to one of 
generality with a preference for uniformity. Localized, jurisdictional, and 
quasi-private rulemaking and office-holding ineluctably gave way to a more 
centralized, political, and distinctly public vision of administration and 
administrative law.12 Just as conceptions of national citizenship and 
 
11 NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 1 (2013); see also id. at 198 (“Tax ferrets had the incentive 
and the will to engage in surveillance in a way the local assessors never had.”). 
12 Of course, this is one of the key themes of Nicholas Parrillo’s work on the “salary revolution” 
in government. Beyond professionalization and civil service, “[u]niform fee schedules for official 
services” were part of a movement toward “uniformity,” including the trend “to suppress private 
laws and local laws,” “the replacement of special corporate charters with general incorporation,” and 
“the shift in public finance from ad hoc levies . . . toward a general property tax.” Id. at 92. On a 
similar trend from private to public prosecution in criminal justice, see ALLEN STEINBERG, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 1 (1989); WILLIAM J. 
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (2011). 
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constitutional rights grudgingly shed an earlier history of localism, 
particularity, and discrimination, the nature of social representation through 
democratic politics and statecraft moved just as slowly—but surely—toward 
more generalized conceptions of social need and public interest. The political 
culture of generality involved a new vision of a democratic society 
autonomously responsible for the production of its own collective future as 
well as a new understanding of positive and purposeful political freedom.13 
Administration was the primary vehicle of this new vision of state and law—
a new public administration and a modern administrative law—committed to 
serving society’s needs and meeting a redefined general public interest. 
Such new and positive ideas of statecraft, law, and administration quickly 
moved the American polity beyond traditional concerns with the 
maintenance of public order and early techniques of local-legal policing and 
fiscal-military organization. A distinctly modern notion of a public service state 
came into being, self-consciously oriented around the significant new 
obligations of tackling large-scale public problems and satisfying ever-
expanding socioeconomic needs. No one apprehended this functionalist shift 
from “public authority” to “public service” better than the French legal 
sociologist and state theorist Léon Duguit. Duguit argued that patrimonial 
and authoritarian forms of state were in decline amid the rise of new forms 
of social interdependence and democratic political aspiration. As he observed, 
“Government and its officials are no longer the masters of men imposing the 
sovereign will on their subjects . . . . They are simply the managers of the 
nation’s business.”14 Duguit came to the attention of most Americans through 
the interventions of Harold Laski who counseled Roscoe Pound that “[t]he 
most striking change in the political organization of the last half century is 
the rapidity with which . . . the state has been driven to assume a positive 
character . . . . We live in a new world, and a new theory of the state is 
necessary to its adequate operation.”15 Laski’s other chief correspondent, Felix 
Frankfurter, was already building such a new theory of the state around what 
he called “Public Services and the Public.” Beyond the “traditional 
governmental functions of police and justice,” Frankfurter identified a new 
relationship of “The Public and Its Government” structured around the new 
 
13 On the political culture of generality, see PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMACY: IMPARTIALITY, REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY, 38-43 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2011) 
(2008); Marcel Gauchet, Democracy: From One Crisis to Another, in 1 SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 163-87 
(Natalie Doyle trans., 2015); Wim Weymans, Freedom Through Political Representation: Lefort, Gauchet 
and Rosanvallon on the Relationship Between State and Society, 4 EUR. J. POL. THEORY, 263, 276 (2005). 
14 LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 51 (1919). See also ROSANVALLON , supra 
note 13, at 39 (“[T]hose who govern are not merely instruments of an authority that looms above 
the society that instituted it. They are merely the managers of the public’s business.”). 
15 Harold J. Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England: To Roscoe Pound, 32 HARV. L. REV. 
447, 462, 472 (1919). 
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“tasks of government, the demands citizens make upon government, [and] 
the instruments by which these demands are executed . . . .”16 Consequently, 
modern public law added to its purview an ever-expanding body of rules and 
institutions for the efficient management, organization, and control of public 
services and policies. As Duguit concluded, “[p]ublic law is thus no longer 
the body of rules regulating the relation of a sovereign state with its subjects; 
it is rather the body of rules inherently necessary to the organisation and 
management of certain services.”17 
This articulation began the road to a reimagined administration. The 
modern reorientation of a reorganized state around the provision of public 
services brought increased attention to the science of public administration 
and the development of administrative law as scholars such as Woodrow 
Wilson, Frank Goodnow, Ernst Freund, Bruce Wyman, Felix Frankfurter, 
and James Landis elevated the topics to new heights of analytical scrutiny and 
self-consciousness. “Administrative law has not come like a thief in the night,” 
Frankfurter contended, but “general recognition” and “self-conscious 
direction” were another matter.18 The phrase “administrative law” first 
appeared in the U.S. Supreme Court Reports in 1909 and sporadically for the 
next generation.19 From Wilson to Frankfurter to Landis, two generations of 
political and legal scholars worked assiduously, as Ernst Freund put it, to 
make administrative law “more familiar to the public, and especially to the 
legal profession,” turning it into one of the more “recognized branches of 
public law.”20 Modern administration was a central part to what Woodrow 
Wilson labeled the “New Meaning of Government.” Wilson held that the 
expansion and rationalization of governmental administration was a necessary 
product of the increasing functions and demands placed on modern social 
service states, from conservation to pure food and drugs to labor and price 
regulation to public health and sanitation by reasoning: 
 
16 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 2, 81 (1930). 
17 DUGUIT, supra note 14, at 243. 
18 Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 47 YALE L.J. 515, 517 (1938). 
19 American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 350 (1909). See also 
Frankfurter, supra note 18, at 517. As Frankfurter complained: “To this day administrative law has no 
rubric in the ordinary digests, and flickering cross-references to the subject first begin to appear in 
220 United States Reports. Not until 280 United States Reports does the term appear to have 
established itself in the index.” Id. at 518. 
20 Ernst Freund, The Law of the Administration in America, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 403, 404 (1894). 
Furthermore, consider that in 1894, Freund was still talking in terms of “law of the administration.” 
Id. Freund lauds FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, 
FRANCE AND GERMANY 7 (1893), for popularizing the apt term “administrative law”—“[i]ts subject 
matter being the administration of public affairs, as distinguished from legislation on the one side 
and from the jurisdiction of the courts on the other.” Freund, supra, at 404. 
 
2019] The Progressive Idea of Democratic Administration 1829 
Nowadays we consider it the duty of statesmen to see that women are not 
overburdened with work; that children are not dwarfed and stunted by too 
great a burden of labor; that factories are properly ventilated; that dangerous 
machinery is properly guarded; that rivers are kept pure and cities clean; that 
hospitals are provided; that education is put within the reach of everybody, 
and that the humblest citizen of our country has a full chance to live and 
thrive.21 
“Administration is everywhere putting its hands to new undertakings,” 
Wilson argued in “The Study of Administration” and went on to explain that 
“[t]he idea of the state and the consequent ideal of its duty are undergoing 
noteworthy change; and ‘the idea of the state is the conscience of 
administration.’”22 In “The Task of Administrative Law,” Felix Frankfurter 
also connected the growth of administration and administrative law to new 
tasks of state: “[p]rofound new forces call for new social inventions . . . . The 
‘great society,’ with its permeating influence of technology, large-scale 
industry, and progressive urbanization, presses its problems.”23 Leonard D. 
White defined “public administration” simply as “the management of men 
and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state[,] . . . the 
most efficient utilization of the resources at the disposal of officials[,] . . . 
[and] the most rapid and complete achievement of public purposes.”24 
As Wilson, Frankfurter, White, and many others made clear, the turn-of-
the-century revolution in administration was very much concerned with 
efficiency, expertise, professionalization, rationalization, centralization, and 
scientific and technical management and organization. But it must be 
underscored the degree to which the self-conscious development of modern 
administration and administrative law turned on a new generalization of 
social and public interest. The invention of modern American administration 
was distinctly connected to a positive reform agenda and the progressive idea 
of the state as an efficient mechanism of larger social and public purpose. 
Herbert Croly famously articulated a broad vision of progressive democracy 
bound to the “expression of a permanent public interest” as “interested in 
efficient administration as it is in reconstructive legislation.”25 In his path-
 
21 Woodrow Wilson, The New Meaning of Government, WOMAN’S HOME COMPANION, Nov. 
1912, at 4. Elaborated further, Wilson’s new vision of administration was distinctly tied to a new 
conception of “democratic government.” Id. at 3. “Before the dawn of democracy,” Wilson contended 
bluntly, “[m]en were allowed to die like flies.” Id. at 4. 
22 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887) (internal 
citation omitted). 
23 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 617 (1927). 
24 LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2 
(1926). 
25 Herbert Croly, State Political Reorganization, 6 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 122, 132 (1912). 
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breaking treatise The Principles of the Administrative Law Governing the 
Relations of Public Officers, Bruce Wyman first laid out his famous basic 
framework of “internal” and “external” administrative law while 
simultaneously contemplating the law of public service corporations and the 
general growth of state regulation at the turn of the twentieth century.26 As 
Wyman put it, “[s]tate regulation is the prevailing philosophy . . . the spirit 
of our present age.”27 “The present programme of organized society,” he 
noted, recognized “that freedom of action may, even in the industrial world, 
work injuriously for the public, and it must then be restrained in the public 
interest.”28 For Frankfurter, public service, public interest, and “public trust” 
were at the very heart of the project of administrative law from the first state 
railroad commissions to the more omnibus state public utility commissions 
to the national development of the first independent regulatory 
commissions.29 The “range and complexity” of these commissions, 
Frankfurter contended, “constituted new political inventions responsive to 
the pressure of new economic and social facts.”30 Frankfurter frequently 
invoked Governor Charles Evans Hughes’s famous 1907 defense of 
administrative regulation: “There is also need of regulation and strict 
supervision to ensure adequate service and due regard for the convenience 
and safety of the public. The most practicable way of attaining these ends is 
for the Legislature to confer proper power upon a subordinate administrative 
body.”31 “Commodore Vanderbilt’s ‘the public be damned’ had at last a 
counterpoise” in what Frankfurter called “the quiet work of public 
administration”—“solid proof that government could meet needs of society 
at once the most complicated and fundamental.”32 
 
26 See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903). 
27 1 BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS 
AND ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT vi (1911). 
28 Id. 
29 See FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 86 (“[N]ew legislation was intended to create 
governmental instruments and processes through which sound relations between public utilities and 
the public could work themselves out. To that end, a nonpolitical administrative agency was 
established . . . .”). 
30 Id. at 88. 
31 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, 1906–1908, at 89–90 (1908). 
32 FRANKFURTER, supra note 16, at 89, 134. For an excellent book-length examination of these 
links between progressivism, democracy, and administration, see BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S 
LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (2019). 
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II. THE IDEA OF DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 
With the rapid proliferation of modern public services, the American 
administrative state—along all of its jurisdictional dimensions (local, state, 
and federal)—reached an important point of modern development. Positive 
conceptions of statecraft and law yielded a more pragmatic and instrumental 
vision of government directed toward the resolution of public problems and 
the satisfaction of social needs. Public administration and administrative law 
achieved a new self-consciousness and visibility as the principle vehicles for 
the general delivery of an ever-expanding array of state services. The period 
from 1866–1932 was nothing less than an age of administration. 
And there is no shortage of political, legal, and historical assessments of 
this modern administrative revolution.33 To date, however, the dominant 
interpretations have been captured by a single, overriding theme—the rise of 
modern bureaucracy and technocracy. Here, the modern history of the 
administrative state is subsumed beneath a veritable “bureaucracy fetish.”34 
Max Weber contributed the archetype, placing at the very center of 
modernity “the basic fact of the irresistible advance of bureaucratization,” 
wherein “the bureaucratic apparatus” concentrates the “means of operation.”35 
As Talcott Parsons once put it, “[r]oughly, for Weber, bureaucracy plays the 
part that the class struggle played for Marx . . . .”36 Jürgen Habermas echoed 
this, stating that “[f]or Weber, bureaucratization is a key to understanding 
 
33 See generally, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 
1862–1928 (2001); BRIAN J. COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1996); JOHN A. ROHR, TO 
RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1986); STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982); RICHARD J. STILLMAN II, CREATING THE 
AMERICAN STATE: THE MORAL REFORMERS AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE WORLD 
THEY MADE (1998); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1967); Louis 
Galambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44 BUS. HIST. REV. 
279 (1970). 
34 See William J. Novak, Beyond Max Weber: The Need for a Democratic (Not Aristocratic) Theory 
of the Modern State, 36 TOCQUEVILLE REV. 43, 74-76 (2015) (describing the tendency of conflating 
“the state” with “bureaucracy”). 
35 MAX WEBER, The Bureaucratization of Politics and the Economy, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY 109, 110, 114 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1999). The heightened attention to bureaucracy 
in Weber was only exacerbated by an American reception that first translated and fixated on the 
“bureaucratic” aspects of his oeuvre. See generally MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX 
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 196-244 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946). Robert 
K. Merton’s Social Theory and Social Structure contained no index entry for “state,” but seventeen 
separate entries for various discussions of “bureaucracy” and “bureaucratization.” ROBERT K. 
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 693-94 (2d ed. 1968). 
36 2 TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION: A STUDY IN SOCIAL 
THEORY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A GROUP OF RECENT EUROPEAN WRITERS 509 (1949). 
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modern societies.”37 “[P]rogress” toward “bureaucratic officialdom” and the 
“bureaucratic state” became the “unambiguous yardstick” for assessing 
modernization and its unambiguous turn toward systems rationality, 
centralization, professionalization, expertise, and autonomous 
administration.38 “Routines of administration”—that is, processes of 
“adjudicating and administering according to rationally established law and 
regulation”—were necessary accoutrements of a modern system of rule 
“necessarily and unavoidably” bureaucratic.39 As Theodore Lowi concluded, 
such rationalized administration “may indeed be the sine qua non of 
modernity.”40 
Of course, Max Weber was notoriously ambivalent about the normative 
implications of this modern governmental turn towards bureaucratic 
administration. His pessimistic assessments of modernity’s “iron cage” and 
“shell of bondage” have been seconded by a legion of students of bureaucracy 
who see the administrative revolution as a troubling departure from original 
traditions of self-rule, popular governance, and political autonomy, raising 
concerns about technocracy, the relentless conquest of instrumental 
rationality, and roads to future serfdom and despotism. From propagandistic 
critiques such as James Beck’s Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy,41 to popular 
 
37 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND 
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 306 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 3d ed. 
1987) (1981). Habermas elaborated on Weber’s notion of a modern “society of organizations,” observing 
that “economic production is organized in a capitalist manner, with rationally calculating entrepreneurs; 
public administration is organized in a bureaucratic manner, with juristically trained, specialized officials—
that is, they are organized in the form of private enterprises and public bureaucracies.” Id. 
38 WEBER, Bureaucratization, supra note 35, at 109. 
39 Id. at 109-110. In Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Weber expanded 
these categories into eight more specific attributes of modern “legal authority with a bureaucratic 
administrative staff ”: 1) the continuous rule-bound conduct of official business; 2) the rigorous 
specification of jurisdictional competence; 3) the hierarchical organization of offices; 4) the 
governance of offices via technical rules or norms; 5) the separation of ownership and control in 
administrative decisionmaking; 6) the objective rather than subjective nature of rights in an office; 
7) the importance of written documentation of administrative acts, decisions, and rules; and 8) the 
presence of an elaborate administrative staff-officialdom, bureaucracy. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 218-219 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968). 
40 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES 21 (2d ed., 1979) (“The modern method of social control involves the application 
of rationality to all social relations . . . . Rationality applied to social control is administration.”). 
41 See, e.g., JAMES M. BECK, OUR WONDERLAND OF BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF THE 
GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND ITS DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT 
UPON THE CONSTITUTION vii (1932) (originating a persistent Alice-in-Wonderland trope in the 
history of administration, where “Uncle Sam has many of the child-like and naive characteristics of 
little Alice, and . . . he, too, is dreaming in a wonderland of socialistic experiments in a government, 
whose constitution was intended to be a noble assertion of individualism.”); E. PENDLETON 
HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST xi-xii (1936) (deploying the 
same Lewis Carroll chapter headings). 
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explorations like Walter Lippmann’s The Phantom Public,42 to political and 
sociological assessments like James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution and 
C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite, treatments of the modern administration 
as an anti-democratic bureaucracy and elite technocracy abound.43 For Jürgen 
Habermas, “the mounting bureaucratization of the administration in state 
and society” and the rise of planning, distribution, and government 
intervention by “highly specialized experts” spelled the doom of the “critical 
publicity” of the bourgeois public sphere.44 Like his Frankfurt school 
colleagues, Habermas fretted about “the lure of technocracy,” the divorce of 
organized system from ethical life, and the ultimate threat that “the technical 
means of destruction increase along with the technical means of satisfying 
needs.”45 Even Pierre Rosanvallon assessed these turn-of-the-century 
administrative developments as bureaucratic, technocratic, and ultimately 
worrisome: “The emphasis on efficiency and scientific administration revived 
an old prejudice . . . . It was for want of being able . . . to conceive of 
government democratically that administrative-executive power once more 
came to be accepted in both France and America as a central element of 
governmental organization in the guise of technocracy.”46 Such elite 
technocratic administration reflected an inability or at least an unwillingness 
to think government democratically.47 Of course, a flood of late twentieth 
century neo-liberal critiques of the modern regulatory and social-welfare 
state loudly echoed such indictments of the dangerous, anti-democratic 
nature of bureaucratic administration.48 
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LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925). 
43 See generally KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION: A STUDY 
IN THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1953); JAMES BURNHAM, THE 
MACHIAVELLIANS: DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM (1943); JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION: WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE WORLD (1941); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER 
ELITE (1956); WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956). 
44 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY, 233, 235 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989). 
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MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998); Gary S. Becker, Competition 
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In law, this anti-bureaucratic position has a distinguished (if 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon) pedigree. Building on a nineteenth century 
British constitutional literature increasingly aimed—in Henry Maine’s 
words—at “applying the curb to popular impulses,”49 Albert Venn Dicey made 
the formal legal case against administration as bureaucracy—as Gallican droit 
administratif.50 Dicey viewed the historic English rule of law tradition as 
inherently antithetical to an administrative law that he deemed foreign and 
dangerous: “the whole scheme of administrative law was opposed to . . . 
essential characteristics of English institutions.”51 Dicey saw seeds of tyranny 
in administrators “who, if not actually part of the executive, are swayed by 
official sympathies, and who are inclined to consider the interest of the state, 
or of the government, more important than strict regard to the legal rights of 
individuals.”52 As Felix Frankfurter noted, “Few law books in modern times 
have had an influence comparable to that produced by the brilliant 
obfuscation of Dicey’s The Law of the Constitution.”53 But despite what 
Frankfurter described as Dicey’s “sociological sterility” and “misconceptions 
and myopia,” about the “[r]ule of [l]aw” versus “the development of 
administrative law,” Dicey’s indictment of administration as foreign statism 
continued to influence “[g]enerations of judges and lawyers.”54 
Indeed, today it remains common for discussion of the administrative 
revolution to take the form of an ongoing duel between bureaucracy and the 
rule of law. According to a recent influential historical treatment, the struggle 
over modern administration was “Tocqueville’s nightmare.”55 Tocqueville’s 
alleged nightmare was nothing less than centralized administrative 
“bureaucracies through which federal officials could impose their will on a 
dispersed and factious people.”56 Should centralized administration and 
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55 DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
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bureaucracy carry the day, Tocqueville warned, “a more insufferable 
despotism would prevail than any which now exists in the monarchical states 
of Europe . . . .”57 For Daniel Ernst, the answer to the specter of 
totalitarianism haunting the development of the bureaucratic state was again 
the rule of law as a cadre of artful American lawyers built into administrative 
law constitutional curbs protecting a modicum of concern for due process, 
judicial review, individual rights, and limited government.58 For Philip 
Hamburger, even such legal and constitutional protections were not enough, 
as he deemed the administrative power underwriting the modern American 
bureaucracy “absolutist,” “extralegal,” “supralegal,” “unconstitutional,” and 
basically “unlawful.”59 Hamburger’s position is comparable to that of Dicey, 
who argued: “The words ‘administrative law’ . . . are unknown to English 
judges . . . . This absence from our language of any satisfactory equivalent for 
the expression droit administratif is significant; the want of a name arises at 
bottom from our non-recognition of the thing itself.”60 Like Frankfurter, 
Bruce Wyman’s Administrative Law deemed a Diceyean position basically out-
of-date in America as early as 1903.61 
It is important, however, to underscore how all these approaches to the 
modern administrative revolution elide one of its foundational premises—
democracy. Administration and administrative law were crucial parts of the 
transformation of public law that created a new democratic state. All of the 
exclusive emphasis on bureaucracy and the rule of law in this period has come 
at the expense of what this generation claimed over and over again was 
actually at stake in these contests and struggles—the making of a new 
democracy. It would be a mistake of historical interpretation to confuse the 
modern transformation of American administration with an anti-democratic 
bureaucratic or technocratic archetype. 
As Stephen Sawyer has convincingly shown, Tocqueville himself was no 
inveterate opponent of administration or administrative law per se. Nor did he see 
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administration as inherently at odds with democracy. To the contrary, his 
reflections on New England police power, as well as his concerns with inequality 
and pauperism, made it clear that a certain kind of administration was absolutely 
necessary to democratic states tending to the social-economic demands of a 
politically empowered and self-governing people. Tocqueville was concerned 
about the dangers of a Napoleonic centralization severed from the people such as 
a consolidated executive power that governed civil society but that no longer arose 
from it (after all, that was the problem of the Ancien Régime). But he explicitly 
acknowledged that “[t]he social order was in the throes of a rapid evolution, giving 
rise to new needs, and each of these was an added source of power to the central 
government”62: to include “relief measures,” “public works programs,” “social 
service programs,” control of “money and credit,” economic regulation, etc.63 Such 
growing social and economic needs—the “care to be taken of the people”—showed 
no signs of dissipating in modern industrializing societies.64 So in the end, 
Tocqueville understood the positive problem of developing a democratic form of 
effective state administration to be the central problem of the age: “Our 
administrative law has generated intelligent and useful commentaries, but it has 
not been studied or judged as a whole by a great public thinker . . . . [T]here is 
perhaps no other subject in our times that merits more attention by our 
philosophers and statesmen.”65 
The founders of modern American administrative law and statecraft were 
only too aware of Tocqueville’s democratic mandate. As early as 1887, 
Woodrow Wilson insisted that modern American administration was not 
about bureaucracy and technocracy: “[T]o fear the creation of a domineering, 
illiberal officialism . . . is to miss altogether the principle upon which I wish 
most to insist. That principle is, that administration in the United States must 
be at all points sensitive to public opinion.”66 Wilson’s “new meaning of 
government” was deeply rooted in a fundamentally democratic aspiration 
worth quoting at length: 
Democratic government has, the world over, had deep and far-reaching 
results. It has created a new conception of the functions of government. It is 
not merely that democratic government is based, as the old phrase used to 
go, on the “consent of the governed,” but that it is based upon the 
participation in government of all classes and interests; and whenever this 
 
62 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 59 
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conception can be realized, whenever government is disentangled from its 
connection with special interests and made responsive to genuine public 
opinion, throughout the length and breadth of the great country, it at once 
gets new ideals and responds to new impulses. It then becomes an instrument 
of civilization and of humanity . . . . It is part of the new meaning of 
government, therefore, that its resources are not to be put at the disposal of 
a governing class or of any limited set of governing influences, but that those 
who exercise its authority must “keep house” for the whole people . . . . It is 
an interesting circumstance that government is becoming less and less a 
business for politicians; that minds and energies of every kind are turning 
towards it as part of the general enterprise of life . . . . These changes in the 
business and character of government are not taking place because of any 
special knowledge of a few men, the leaders of parties and of public thought. 
They are, on the contrary, coming from out of the general body of the nation 
itself. The government is becoming more and more a sensitive, registering 
instrument. Public opinion has accumulated tremendous force in our day, not 
only, but it shows infinite richness and variety. Men of many occupations, of 
many interests, of many aspirations, contribute to it. Neighborhood 
meetings, city assemblies, state conventions, interstate gatherings, national 
conventions, are held by people of every sort interested in every kind of 
occupation . . . . The fine result of it all is that the common interest is 
becoming more and more clear . . . . For government is an instrument, not an 
object in itself. We ought to be interested in it only as it express the purpose 
of the people of the country.”67 
Of course, sentiments like these at the very foundation of modern 
American administration encapsulated the dominant themes of progressive 
new democracy—from its anti-formalism to its substantive vision of 
democracy as a “way of life”; from its critique of private power and plutocracy 
to its endorsement of pubic interest. While rationalization, systemization, 
and professionalization were certainly key aspects of modern governmental 
process, the administrative revolution was born of a radical reform energy 
and an insurgent self-consciousness concerning the new inequalities, 
exclusions, oppressions, and acute social needs that threatened the democratic 
legitimacy of American public and private life. In place of bureaucracy or 
technocracy—yet along some kind of ancient Whig constitution or “rule of 
law”—the history of the origins of the modern American administrative state 
must first be understood in the context of such new democratic principles. 
The first thing to note about the architects of modern American 
administrative law is that they were radical anti-formalists in the new 
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democratic tradition. Frank J. Goodnow, frequently acknowledged as the 
“father of American administration,” produced many technical treatises on 
the subject.68 But he was also author of one of the era’s most influential and 
radical critiques of formal law and conservative constitutionalism.69 Joining 
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States70 and J. Allen Smith’s The Spirit of American Government,71 Goodnow’s 
Social Reform and the Constitution carved out a critical legal space for the 
development of the new administrative state.72 Taking note of the 
“tremendous changes in political and social conditions,” Goodnow advocated 
a critical, pragmatic, and historicist approach to law and constitution averse 
to the static anachronisms of formal juristic conservatism.73 Echoing Smith’s 
chapter titled “The Constitution as a Reactionary Document,”74 Goodnow 
attacked “the superstitious reverence” that accepted the Constitution as “the 
last word which can be said as to the proper form of government . . . suited 
to all times and conditions.”75 Such constitutional formalism, he noted, 
imported an eighteenth century political theory of social compact and natural 
right that presupposed that society was “static rather than progressive in 
character.”76 The unfortunate result was “to fix upon the country for all time 
institutions, which . . . may in this the twentieth century be unsuitable 
because of the economic, social, and political changes which have taken place 
in the last hundred years.”77 He embraced Theodore Roosevelt’s critique of 
the “false but mischievous” view of the Constitution as a “strait-jacket to be 
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used for the control of an unruly patient—the people.”78 Like Wilson, 
Goodnow endorsed instead a new positive, progressive, and dynamic 
approach to the Constitution that would enable a new public law and 
administration—flexible, responsive to public opinion, and adaptable to the 
changing needs of modern public life. This was a new democratic vision of 
constitutional dynamism in the public interest: “[O]ur constitutions are 
instruments designed to secure justice by securing the deliberate but effective 
expression of the popular will.”79 
Modern administrative law emerged directly out of such democratically-
oriented antiformalism. The constitutional critiques of reformers like 
Goodnow, Smith, and Beard provided the intellectual groundwork for a 
jurisprudential transition away from traditional ideas about quasi-private 
office-holders and formal constitutional limitations and towards the public 
law legitimacy of broad-scale legislative and administrative action in the 
public interest. Such a critical perspective was a key part of Goodnow’s effort 
to create a generalized vision of public state administrators beyond the highly 
particularized and partial constraints of the fee system as well as existing 
common-law rules governing office-holding.80 And it was equally crucial to 
Goodnow’s attempt to create room for administration beyond the formal 
constitutional conceptions of federalism and separation of powers. Ernst 
Freund, Goodnow’s student and the other key “pioneer of administrative 
law,”81 also emphasized the central “freeing of American public law from what 
he conceived to be the crippling dominance of constitutional law.”82 Realism, 
pragmatism, and critical constitutionalism were crucial parts of Goodnow and 
Freund’s bold agenda to expand legislative and administrative powers to meet 
the demands of social reform for increased legislative regulation, government 
aid, and even public ownership.83 As Ernst Freund put it, “Professor 
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Goodnow expresses a generally recognized view when he says that technical 
efficiency is not the only and not the first consideration in the administrative 
organization.”84 Modern American administration was no mere elite technical 
project. It was radical, critical, and in the end democratic. In Walter Weyl’s 
words, it involved a “not unreverential breaking of the tablets of tradition” in 
the midst of “a democratic revolt.”85 Like Tocqueville, Freund acknowledged 
the “technical superiority” of existing forms of European bureaucracy, but he 
made it clear that the task of the age in America consisted of accommodating 
necessary administration to the historic project of self-government in an 
“extreme democratic spirit.”86 
Antiformalism created important new room in American law for the 
emergence of a more generalized and public—rather than particularized and 
private—conception of administrative action. The second new democratic 
idea at play in the development of the modern administrative state further 
extended this general public conception by centering a vision of democratic 
administration built on the protection of public over and against private 
interest. Here, substantive issues of economic inequality, political unfairness, 
and systemic bias and discrimination moved to the very center of the 
American administrative project. Indeed, one of the leading motivations for 
the turn to modern administration was an acute awareness of the troubling 
ascendancy of private special economic interests in turn-of-the-century 
American politics. Administration was an attempt to reclaim the democratic 
high ground in a political regime thoroughly beset by plutocracy and 
corruption. Plutocracy and corruption were the ubiquitous political bywords 
of the day. And their meaning was clear and unambiguous to all observers—
the anti-democratic capture of the public political sphere by corrupting 
private economic interests. Though “regulatory capture” by special interests 
is erroneously seen as a problem confined to administrative regulation, it must 
be remembered that modern administration was originally developed as an 
explicit response to the overwhelming capture of supposedly democratic 
legislatures, councils, cities, states, and even courts by dominant economic 
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interests. Anti-democratic capture, in other words, was not an unfortunate 
consequence of administration, it was arguably its raison d’etre.87 
“Our resplendent plutocracy,” was Walter Weyl’s moniker for the corrupt 
and aristocratic alliance of “political ‘bosses’” and “railroad ‘kings’” and 
“Senate ‘oligarchies’”—the new agglomerations of corporate wealth and 
political power that produced a dangerous new mixture of the age-old threat 
of private interest trumping public democracy.88 Such “corruption” marked 
the rise of an “indifference to public concerns” that John Dewey and James 
Tufts saw as beginnings of an undermining of “the democratic ideal”: 
the control of the inner machinery of governmental power by a few who can 
work in irresponsible secrecy . . . incites to deliberate perversion of public 
functions into private advantages. As embezzlement is appropriation of trust 
funds to private ends, so corruption, “graft,” is prostitution of public 
resources, whether of power or of money, to personal or class interests.89 
As Vernon Parrington put it, from this “degradation of democratic 
dogma,” emerged the task of the times “[t]o curb the ambitions of plutocracy 
and preserve the democratic bequest for the common benefit of all”—to 
“wrest possession of the government from the hands of the plutocracy that 
was befouling it, and to use it for democratic rather than plutocratic ends.”90 
Administration and administrative law were at the center of that new 
democratic quest. 
Now, of course, the corrupting threat of private versus public interest to 
democratic self-interest was not a wholly modern concern. In Plato’s Republic, 
Socrates noted that “in founding the city we are not looking to the exceptional 
happiness of any one group among us but, as far as possible, that of the city 
as a whole.” “Our aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate 
happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole . . . .”91 He 
bemoaned “the corruption of society” whereby “the guardians of the laws and 
of the government are only seeming and not real guardians” who “turn the 
State upside down.”92 Aristotle’s Politics also decried the corrupting effects of 
private interest and private vice on the commonwealth, noting, the “true 
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forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the 
many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which 
rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or 
of the many, are perversions.”93 This theme and concern had powerful 
resonance throughout early American history—from the concerns of the 
founding generation with faction and corruption to the Jacksonian obsession 
with private privileges bestowed through corporate charters and other forms 
of private legislation.94 
Although concern about private interests corrupting the public welfare 
was as old as the republic, what was new at the turn of the twentieth century 
was an acute awareness of the unprecedented threat to democratic politics 
posed by the arrival of large-scale business and corporate interests in rail, oil, 
meatpacking, and insurance, whose corruptions were cataloged in a relentless 
series of muckraking reports and even fictional portrayals from Charles 
Francis and Henry Adams’s Chapters of Erie to Frank Norris’s McTeague, The 
Octopus, and The Pit.95 Historian Richard L. McCormick correctly placed this 
basic “Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics”—the awakening of the 
people to illicit private business influence in democratic political life—at the 
very core of the entire progressive reform movement.96 Ida Tarbell, Lincoln 
Steffens, Ray Stannard Baker and countless other journalists and scholars 
spent enormous time and energy exposing the various frauds, thefts, bribes, 
extortions, and schemes that seemed to now permanently link selfish robber 
barons to corrupt politicos (to use Matthew Josephson’s evocative terms).97 
As Thorstein Veblen concluded in his chapter “Business Principles in Law 
and Politics,” “constitutional government has, in the main, become a 
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department of the business organization and is guided by the advice of the 
business men.”98 
Corruption and the pursuit of selfish private and economic interests in 
the democratic public sphere was seen as the central problem confronting 
American democracy at the turn of the century. And time after time, 
administration was offered up as a distinctly democratic solution. 
In the economic regulatory field, the reformer who most clearly 
articulated the explicit relationship between corruption and democratic 
administration was Charles Francis Adams. A lawyer, a historian, a regulator, 
a railroad executive, and a member of one of the most influential families in 
American politics and letters, Adams was also one of the central pioneers of 
modern administration as a response to the scandalous economic and political 
corruption that surrounded the railroad problem. The picture Adams painted 
was ominous and urgent: in “A Chapter of Erie,” he described the battle for 
control of the Erie Railroad between the Erie men—Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and 
Daniel Drew—and Cornelius Vanderbilt as nothing less than the “Erie 
war”—so rife with corruption that participants were literally running away 
with bags of money.99 For Adams, the railroad problem involved not just the 
economic crisis of expensive “natural monopolies” operating in an 
atmosphere of “ruinous competition.”100 Rather, anticipating Richard 
McCormick, Adams contended that the railroad problem involved the 
explicitly political problem of private business interests corrupting the public 
body politic; “the sturdy corporation beggars who infested the lobby” of state 
legislatures.101 As Adams saw it, “our legislatures are now universally 
becoming a species of irregular boards of railroad direction” creating 
persistent “scandal and alarm.”102 “The effects upon political morality have 
been injurious,” he suggested, adding that “[m]any States in this country, and 
especially New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland have now for 
years notoriously been controlled by their railroad corporations.”103 
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So, here was the original democratic problem posed by the railroads—the 
capture of the existing elected legislators and officeholders by the newly 
dominant private economic interests. Adams made it clear that “neither 
competition nor legislation have proved themselves effective agents for the 
regulation of the railroad system.”104 And so, he probed further, “what other 
and more effective [instrument] is there within the reach of the American 
people?”105 Of course, Adams’s answer was administration. Noting that “there 
is no power which can purify a corrupted legislature,” Adams turned instead 
to the administrative regulatory commission—independent, permanent, and 
competent tribunals that he analogized to courts.106 While it might be 
tempting to view this turn to an unelected special regulatory commission as 
inherently undemocratic and technocratic, the original impulse was quite the 
opposite. Adams noted developments in the Midwest, where administrative 
innovations like the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission were 
explicitly demanded by popular uprisings and state constitutional 
conventions of the people. As Adams put it, “The railroad corporations, 
necessarily monopolists, constitute a privileged class living under a form of 
government intended to inhibit all class legislation.”107 Therein lay the 
substance of antidemocracy—in the private political-economic 
aggrandizement of special interests. Democracy required a response in the 
form of general laws and general regulations administered again so as to re-
establish the priority of general advantage. Adams recommended a 
strengthening of governmental administrative power to vindicate the general 
interest, arguing that “the task of supervising in some way the railroads of a 
modern State does constitute one of the necessary functions of 
government.”108 
Now, at this critical juncture in the historical development of the modern 
administrative regulatory agency, it must be noted that Charles Francis 
Adams, Jr. was under no illusion that administration was inherently 
democratic—forever magically immune from private influence, economic 
interest, or other forms of special pleading. On the contrary, he specifically 
anticipated the precise question of regulatory capture as early as 1871: “But it 
will be said, Who will guard the virtue of the tribunal? Why should the 
corporations not deal with [the commissions just] as [they did] with the 
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legislatures?”109 Who would guard the guardians? Adams’s answer to such 
questions went to the pragmatic and historical heart of the new democratic 
reform project. In a self-governing democracy, there was no final guarantee, 
no silver bullet, no complete economic or political theory that could forever 
preclude the capture and corruption of governmental institutions for private 
gain and anti-democratic purpose. Democratic vigilance was as necessary as 
it was eternal. In popular forms of government, the only solution was the 
pragmatic, ongoing, never-ending tradition of, as Adams phrased it, 
continually developing “all the checks and balances that human ingenuity can 
devise” to secure more democratic results.110 The solution to the crises of 
modern democracy, in short, was more democracy—and democracy, like the 
state, must always be rediscovered. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reformers turned to 
administration, independent agencies, and regulatory commissions as a new 
kind of democratic check on private economic corruption and public legislative 
capture. Rather than endorse bureaucracy as some kind of permanent 
technocratic response to political modernity, new democratic reformers 
explicitly emphasized the themes of corruption and democracy as a prelude to 
their administrative reform proposals. The peak years of muckraking 
disclosure from 1904 to 1908 were accompanied by a wave of legislative activity 
specifically designed to curb the influence of private interest and private 
money in American politics, including federal and state corrupt practices, laws 
regulating campaign contributions and the solicitation of funds from 
corporations, laws regulating legislative lobbying, laws prohibiting free 
transportation passes, and political reforms such as direct primaries.111 The 
development of modern administration (as well as economic regulatory and 
police power measures) must be understood in this larger context of 
heightened concern about the susceptibility of existing democratic politics to 
capture and corruption by new organizations of private economic interest.  
So while most discussions of administrative constitutionalism focus on 
problems of capture and democratic deficit in the creation of administration 
and bureaucracy, it is important to acknowledge the original democratic 
justifications for modern administrative reform at its moment of inception. 
In contrast to historical, legal, and socio-theoretical portraits of the rise of 
administration primarily as the product of perhaps inevitable modern turns 
toward professionalism, efficiency, technical expertise, and systems 
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rationalization, the architects of modern progressive administration were 
adamant and explicit that their radical innovations were in the larger service 
of democracy. The original democratic ethos that animated the efforts of 
reformers to re-invent public administration and administrative law at the 
turn of the century was very much part of the creation of a more modern 
American state capable of effectively recognizing and serving the needs of a 
democratic public. 
In his essay Democracy and Educational Administration, John Dewey was 
most explicit about the democratic aspirations of administrative reform. 
There he reiterated the new democratic principles that democracy was “much 
broader than a special political form” or “a method of conducting 
government.”112 It involved that, surely, but for Dewey the key was the larger 
democratic “ends” that lie in the development of each and every “human 
personality”—the “way of life, social and individual,” that included the 
“participation of every mature human being” in the formation of the values, 
rules, and social institutions that regulated collective life.113 To view the public 
solely in terms of electoral means and to exclude it from actual participation 
in the governmental determination of public ends was but a “form of coercion 
and suppression . . . more subtle and more effective than . . . overt 
intimidation and restraint.”114 Aristocracy was “blasphemy against 
personality”115—for “[e]very autocratic and authoritarian scheme of social 
action rests on a belief that the needed intelligence is confined to a superior 
few . . . .”116 Dewey volubly resisted any such anti-democratic tendency in 
administration whether educational, national, or municipal. A single fact 
fixed Dewey’s conception of distinctly democratic administration: “It cannot 
be conceived as a sectarian or racial thing nor as a consecration of some form 
of government which has already attained constitutional sanction.”117 Rather, 
democracy was but “a name for the fact that human nature is developed only 
when its elements take part in directing things which are common.”118 As he 
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elaborated in The Public and Its Problems, the two key ingredients of modern 
democratic statecraft were: 1) the organization and active participation of the 
public; and 2) the proper organization of officials and institutions so as to 
secure those distinctly public rather than personal interests.119 
CONCLUSION 
In 1930, Felix Frankfurter opened the timely topic of “Expert 
Administration and Democracy” in The Public and Its Government with a 
prescient one-two punch: “Epitaphs for democracy are the fashion of the day 
. . . . But it is simply not true that the area of democratic government has 
contracted.”120 As scholars and intellectuals have attempted to come to terms 
with the extraordinary growth of the modern American administrative state, 
they have most often worked with the highly visible and theorized themes of 
bureaucracy, technocracy, science, management, and expertise. And more 
frequently than not, the tendency has been to view those governmental 
changes as one-dimensional and fundamentally at odds with democratic 
governance as in Democracy vs. Administration or Man vs. the State. Just as 
frequently, scholars have proffered solutions to the “problem of 
administration” by invoking some kind of intermediating, moderating 
influence, such as the rule of law, an ancient or original constitution, civil 
society, the public sphere, social movements, or the market. But historically, 
we should not forget that the main impulse behind modern American 
administration was political not teleological or inevitable. The turn to 
contingent administrative solutions–-as John Dewey, Jane Addams, Charles 
Francis Adams, and Charles Beard constantly reminded us—was part of a 
broader political-economic struggle and a social contest in favor of more 
democracy—a new democracy. Reformers witnessed traditional democratic 
procedures at the national, state, and municipal level too easily manipulated 
by urban machines, state legislative politicos, and resurgent economic and 
industrial interests so as to corruptly turn the res publica to private service. 
The administrative state was not emblematic of a “crisis in democracy,” it was 
the new democratic response. After all, the modern American administrative 
state was not created for its own sake–-for the self-satisfaction of a 
professional class of technocratic statebuilders. Rather, like the creation of a 
modern constitution (which was also the product of intense political struggle 
and contest), the modern American state was created for the service of larger 
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public and human ends. Woodrow Wilson’s “New Meaning of Government” 
was but a first step on the road to the kind of public and social service-
oriented state endorsed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935: 
[T]o increase the security and happiness of a larger number of people in all 
occupations of life and in all parts of the country; to give them more of the 
good things of life; to give them a greater distribution not only of wealth in 
the narrow terms but of wealth in the wider terms; to give them places to go 
in the Summertime—recreation; to give them assurance that they are not 
going to starve in their old age; to give honest business a chance to go ahead 
and make a reasonable profit; and to give everyone a chance to earn a living.121 
As Roosevelt saw it, the administrative reforms of the New Deal were part 
of this new democratic tradition: “we have made the exercise of all power 
more democratic; for we have begun to bring private autocratic powers into 
their proper subordination to the public’s government.”122 
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